11/16/21

If Not Psychiatry, What Then?

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In June of 2021, the World Health Organization published a document, “Guidance on Community Mental Health Services.”  The WHO document is seeking to provide quality care and support for person-centered, human rights-based and recovery-oriented mental health care and services worldwide. In a video launch of the event, Sir Norman Lamb said: “Our collective aim must be to end coercive practices, including seclusion and restraint, forced admission and treatment. And we must combat violence, abuse and neglect. This is an urgent imperative for all countries. It’s a global human rights priority.”

Reports from around the world highlight the need to address discrimination and promote human rights in mental health care settings. This includes eliminating the use of coercive practices such as forced admission and forced treatment, as well as manual, physical or chemical restraint and seclusion and tackling the power imbalances that exist between health staff and people using the services. Sector-wide solutions are required not only in low-income countries, but also in middle- and high-income countries.

The Executive Summary of the WHO report said global mental health services often face substantial restriction of resources, and operated with outdated legal and regulatory frameworks. There was an overreliance on the biomedical model, where the predominant focus of care was on diagnosis, medication and symptom reduction. Overlooked were the social determinants that impact people’s mental health, hindering progress towards a fuller realization of a human rights-based approach. “As a result, many people with mental health conditions and psychosocial disabilities worldwide are subject to violations of their human rights – including in care services where adequate care and support are lacking.” Key messages of the Guidance said:

According to the WHO Mental Health Atlas 2017, the global median government expenditure on mental health is less than 2% of total government health expenditure. In order to develop quality mental health systems with enough human resources to provide the services and provide adequate support of people’s needs, allocating adequate financial resources is essential. But the problems with mental health provision cannot be dealt with by simply increasing resources. “In fact, in many services across the world, current forms of mental health provision are considered to be part of the problem.”

The majority of existing funding is invested in the renovation and expansion of residential psychiatric and social care institutions. This represents over 80% of total government expenditure on mental health for low- and middle-income countries. “Mental health systems based on psychiatric and social care institutions are often associated with social exclusion and a wide range of human rights violations.” While some countries have taken steps towards closing psychiatric and social institutions, this action has not automatically led to dramatic improvements in care. The history of closing psychiatric hospitals in the U.S. illustrates this point.

The predominant focus of care in many contexts continues to be on diagnosis, medication and symptom reduction. Critical social determinants that impact on people’s mental health such as violence, discrimination, poverty, exclusion, isolation, job insecurity or unemployment, lack of access to housing, social safety nets, and health services, are often overlooked or excluded from mental health concepts and practice. This leads to an over-diagnosis of human distress and over-reliance on psychotropic drugs to the detriment of psychosocial interventions – a phenomenon which has been well documented, particularly in high-income countries. It also creates a situation where a person’s mental health is predominantly addressed within health systems, without sufficient interface with the necessary social services and structures to address the abovementioned determinants. As such, this approach therefore is limited in its consideration of a person in the context of their entire life and experiences. In addition, the stigmatizing attitudes and mindsets that exist among the general population, policy makers and others concerning people with psychosocial disabilities and mental health conditions – for example, that they are at risk of harming themselves or others, or that they need medical treatment to keep them safe – also leads to an over-emphasis on biomedical treatment options and a general acceptance of coercive practices such as involuntary admission and treatment or seclusion and restraint.

Reports from countries in all income brackets around the world highlight extensive and wide-ranging human rights violations that exist in mental health care settings. These violations include the use of coercive practices such as forced admission and forced treatment (as with Britney Spears), as well as manual, physical and chemical restraint and seclusion. In many services, people are exposed to poor, inhuman living conditions, neglect, and in some cases, physical emotional and sexual abuse. People with mental health conditions are also excluded from community life and discriminated against in employment, education, housing and social welfare. These violations further marginalize them from society, “denying them the opportunity to live and be included in their own communities on an equal basis with everyone else.”

A fundamental shift within the mental health field is required, in order to end this current situation. This means rethinking policies, laws, systems, services and practices across the different sectors which negatively affect people with mental health conditions and psychosocial disabilities, ensuring that human rights underpin all actions in the field of mental health. In the mental health service context specifically, this means a move towards more balanced, person-centred, holistic, and recovery-oriented practices that consider people in the context of their whole lives, respecting their will and preferences in treatment, implementing alternatives to coercion, and promoting people’s right to participation and community inclusion.

The End of Psychiatry as We Know it?

In Western society, this means challenging the biologically centered, medical model approach to psychiatry. Writing for Psychology Today, John Read noted how global critics of an overly biological approach to understanding and helping distressed people is often dismissed as radical or extremist. Critics of the dominant medical model approach, promoted by the drug companies and biological psychiatry, are often labeled as “anti-psychiatry.” However, Read replied, “We, however, view ourselves as anti-bad and anti-ineffective, unsafe treatments.” He then quoted Steven Sharfstein, then president of the American Psychiatric Association, who said in 2005:

If we are seen as mere pill pushers and employees of the pharmaceutical industry, our credibility as a profession is compromised. As we address these Big Pharma issues, we must examine the fact that as a profession, we have allowed the bio-psycho-social model to become the bio-bio-bio model.

Read also cited Robert Whitaker, who thought the WHO report was a landmark event. There is a global rethinking of how to treat and think about mental health. Whitaker said, “Model programs highlighted in this WHO publication, most of which are of fairly recent origin, tell of real-world initiatives that are springing up everywhere.” Read said it will be become harder for defenders of the medical model to dismiss organizations like the UN or the WHO as extremist, anti-psychiatry radicals. This can be illustrated by looking at how Psychiatric Times launched “Conversations in Critical Psychiatry,” a series of articles and conversations with prominent individuals who are critical of various aspects of psychiatry.

Dr. Awais Aftab, who is a psychiatrist, not only interviews other psychiatrists such as Dr. Ronald Pies, Dr. Giovanni Fava and Dr. Allen Frances, he also talks with individuals from the critical, so-called anti-psychiatry side of the debate, namely Dr. Joanna Moncrieff, Lucy Johnstone and Dr. Sami Timmi. His first interview in 2019 was with Dr. Frances, the Chair of the DSM-IV Task Force and a vocal critic of the DSM-5, over diagnosis and the state of mental health treatment in the U.S. Follow Drs. Frances and Aftab on Twitter to see what they have to say about the current state of psychiatry. One of the concerns for Dr. Fava has been how the psychiatric establishment uses the term “discontinuation syndrome” to describe “antidepressant withdrawal.” In “The Impoverishment of Psychiatric Knowledge,” he said:

If you teach a psychiatric resident that symptoms that occur during tapering cannot be due to withdrawal, he/she is likely to interpret them as signs of relapse and to go back to treatment (exactly what “Big Pharma” likes). In the UK, the NICE guidelines are changing to reflect the potentially malignant outcome with SSRI and SNRI discontinuation. I do not see anything similar happening in the US.

One of the staunchest defenders against so called anti-psychiatry has been Dr. Ronald Pies, professor emeritus of psychiatry, SUNY Upstate Medical University; and Editor in Chief emeritus of Psychiatric Times. Among the many articles Dr. Pies has written over the years defending establishment psychiatry and psychiatric practice are these on Psychiatric Times from the past year: “What Kind of Science is Psychiatry?”, “Do Psychiatrists Treat Diseases?,” and “Why Thomas Szasz Did Not Write The Myth of the Migraine.” He also wrote “Is Depression a Disease?”, about a report from the British Psychological Society whose central argument was that depression is best thought of as an experience rather than a disease; and “Poor DSM-5—So Misunderstood!”, which challenges the claim that the DSM-5 “offers a biomedical framing of people’s experiences and distress and impairment.”

In “The Battle for the Soul of Psychiatry,” Dr. Aftab and Dr. Pies talked about various issues he’s faced over his career. Dr. Pies agreed with Dr. Aftab that they could have done a better job of counteracting “the so-called ‘chemical imbalance’ trope.” Pies wished he had tackled that issue earlier than 2011. He acknowledged the field of psychiatry took a “fairly sharp turn” toward the biological from roughly 1978 to 1998, “which, to a considerable degree, persists to this day.” Dr. Pies thought the movement toward the biological/biochemical was heavily influenced by the pharmaceutical industry.

His hope for the future of psychiatry was to recover its pluralistic core. He said his department at SUNY Upstate Medical University emphasized the integration of psychopharmacology and psychotherapy, and explicitly endorsed “the biopsychosocial approach.” He supported constructive critics of psychiatry, whose aim was to improve the profession’s concepts, methods, ethics, and treatments. He rejected the “anti-psychiatry” critics, saying their rhetoric was clearly aimed at discrediting psychiatry as a medical discipline. This last charge by Pies seems to be true to a degree.

In their book, Psychiatry Under the Influence, Robert Whitaker and Lisa Cosgrove (two of the anti-psychiatry critics) said the time was ripe for a paradigm shift. Many Americans are seeking alternatives to psychiatry’s medication-centered care. Disagreeing with Dr. Pies, they believed psychiatry was facing a legitimacy crisis from a scientific standpoint. Second generation psychiatric drugs are no better than the first, belying the claim psychiatry is progressing in its somatic treatment of psychiatric diseases. “The disease model paradigm embraced by psychiatry in 1980 has clearly failed, which presents society with a challenge: what should we do instead?”

02/25/20

Rethinking and Transforming Psychiatry

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“We believe that a fundamental rethinking of psychiatric knowledge creation and training is in order.” This statement was made in a commentary published in the New England Medical Journal, “Medicine and the Mind—The Consequences of Psychiatry’s Identity Crisis.” The authors are two prominent Harvard researchers in psychiatry, Caleb Gardner and Arthur Kleinman, so their words cannot be dismissed as ‘anti-psychiatry.’ They went on to say biologic psychiatry has so far failed to produce a comprehensive theoretical model for any major psychiatric disorder. However, they think it would be “too great a loss,” to diminish its role drastically as suggested by Anne Harrington. Rather than contracting to an exclusive focus on biologic structure, “the field needs to expand if we are to meet the needs of real people.”

I have mixed feelings about their proposal. Their critique of biological psychiatry, the acknowledgment of over prescribing psychiatric medication, the abandonment of its social, interpersonal, and psychodynamic foundations are concerns I share. But they balked at Anne Harrington’s proposal in Mind Fixers to limit its scope to severe, mostly psychotic disorders. She said there is hardly any knowledgeable person who believes the so-called biological revolution of the 1980s made good on its therapeutic and scientific promises. “It is now increasingly clear to the general public that it overreached, overpromised, overdiagnosed, overmedicated, and compromised its principles.” If psychiatry needed to be rebuilt, as the authors said, won’t there have to be some dismantling first? Otherwise, there is a danger of building on an unstable, unreliable foundation.

Harrington pointed to how in 2013, just before the publication of the fifth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5), Thomas Insel, who was then the director of NIMH, said the agency was re-orienting its research away from DSM categories; that is was critical to realize that “we cannot succeed if we use DSM categories as the ‘gold standard’” for diagnosis. He said it was like using the nature of chest pain or the quality of a fever to create a diagnostic system. Harrington said, “Put another way, there seemed to be little if any sound biology undergirding the psychiatric enterprise.”

In Psychology Today, Jonathan Shedler wrote, “A Psychiatric Diagnosis Is Not a Disease.” He said there was a circular logic to psychiatric diagnosis. “How do we know a patient has depression? Because they have the symptoms. Why are they having symptoms? Because they have depression.” He elaborated that psychiatric diagnoses were categorically different from medical diagnoses like atherosclerosis, myocarditis, or pneumonia, because they are descriptive rather than explanatory. “Medical diagnoses point to etiology—underlying biological causes.”

In an addendum, Shedler said he appreciated the lively discussion his article inspired. He was surprised by some of the comments, from individuals he assumed to be psychiatrists, who had impugned his credentials to discuss psychiatric diagnosis. But he took comfort in knowing that Allen Frances, MD, Chair of the DSM-IV Task Force, had the same view. Frances also said mental disorders were not diseases, but constructs. They were descriptive, rather than explanatory.

There was a study published in Psychiatry Research, “Heterogeneity in Psychiatric Diagnostic Classification,” that examined the heterogeneous nature of categories within the DSM-5, and its consequences for clinicians, clients and the diagnostic model itself. Heterogeneity was found in specific diagnostic criteria, including symptom comparators, duration of difficulties, indicators of severity, and the perspective used to assess difficulties. Each of the three researchers called for dismantling, not expanding DSM diagnosis.

The lead researcher of the study, Kate Allsopp, said for Medical Express: “Although diagnostic labels create the illusion of an explanation they are scientifically meaningless and can create stigma and prejudice.” Peter Kinderman, another author, said: “This study provides yet more evidence that the biomedical diagnostic approach in psychiatry is not fit for purpose.” He added the diagnostic system wrongly assumed that all distress resulted from disorder. John Read, who was the third author, said: “Perhaps it is time we stopped pretending that medical-sounding labels contribute anything to our understanding of the complex causes of human distress or of what kind of help we need when distressed.”

Psychiatric Times published an interview with Allen Frances for Conversations in Critical Psychiatry. Although he thought psychiatry was among the noblest of professions, “I fear that too many psychiatrists are now reduced to pill pushing, with far too little time to really know their patients well and to apply the rounded biopsychosocial model that is absolutely essential to good care.” He despaired that diagnostic inflation resulted in a too loose of a diagnostic system. “Diagnoses should be written in pencil, and under-diagnosis is almost always safer and more accurate than over-diagnosis.” With regard to epidemiological studies that tend to exaggerate rates of mental disorders, Frances said:

Never believe the extremely high rates of mental disorders routinely reported by epidemiological studies in psychiatry—usually labelling about 25% of the general population as mentally ill in the past year, about 50% lifetime. This entire literature has a systematic, but unacknowledged, methodological bias that inherently results in over-reporting. Because epidemiology requires such huge samples—in the tens of thousands—it is prohibitively expensive to conduct clinical interviews. Instead phone surveys are done by non-clinicians following a highly structured format that allows no clinical judgment whether the symptoms reported cause sufficient clinically significant distress and impairment to qualify as a mental disorder. Since there is no sharp boundary between normal distress and mental disorder, not assessing for clinical significance includes among those labelled mentally ill many who are merely distressed. The rates reported in studies are really only upper limits, not accurate approximations of true rates. They should be, but never are, reported as such.

His final word on DSM was: “DSM should be seen only as a tool helpful in guiding clinical judgment, not as a replacement for it.”

Returning to “Medicine and the Mind” by Gardner and Kleinman, psychiatrist Sandy Steingard said she shared their wish that research funding would be allocated to fields other than basic biologic research. But she was surprised they appeared to support buttressing psychiatry’s hold as leaders in research and program development. “I need some convincing that the problems we agree exist will be best addressed within my profession. In recent years, I have been most impressed by approaches to mental distress that emanate from outside of psychiatry.”

Finally, there was an article published in Public Understanding of Science that aimed to analyze the ‘critical reception’ of the DSM-5—how it has been received, discussed and criticized by different categories of people: “The Critical Reception of the DSM-5.” They noted two major themes surrounding the critical reception of the DSM-5, the pseudo-scientific nature of the manual and its normalizing power. Mental health professionals, especially psychiatrists, were more invested in the debate on the scientific nature of the DSM-5. There was a more eclectic variety of audiences in the debate over the normalizing power of the manual.

In the first debate (the scientific nature of the DSM), we found opposing argumentative positions regarding whether or not the manual is a scientific tool and questioning the type of science to which the manual adheres. In the second debate (the normalising power of the DSM), opinions were also polarised: while some argued that the manual was potentially socially harmful, some pointed out its lack of inherent agency and others mentioned its potential benefits. Although these debates have been noted in previous studies (Demazeux, 2015; Ecks, 2016), our research aims to deepen the understanding of such discussions.

They concluded the DSM was not simply a scientific manual. Rather, it is “a social laboratory where political, sociological, ethical and psychological issues are discussed and confronted.” In order to critically analyze the DSM, the authors said it was important to consider the claims that challenge the APA’s narrative of the DSM, namely its scientific and democratic nature. They said a range of arguments interacted and overlapped “in differing and opposing ways.” This was said to nuance the idea often presented academic publications that critiques of the DSM were mostly fixed, repeating the same themes and antagonistic positions.

The above issues were not being discussed in fringe, antipsychiatry forums. Rather, they appeared in well-received, medical and psychological arenas: The New England Medical Journal, Psychology Today, Psychiatry Research, Medical Express, Psychiatric Times, the National Institute of Mental Health. The people addressing them: Allen Frances, Thomas Insel, Caleb Gardner, Arthur Kleinman and others are or were key individuals within the mental health, psychiatric, diagnostic fields. The time is coming where just discussing the issues and concerns will not be enough; change will be necessary.

Psychiatry and diagnosis need to be reined in. They have extended their “reach” too far as it is, and scaling back is a necessary and essential step before any future recasting of the role of psychiatric treatment for mental “disorders.” Anne Harrington’s suggestion to limit its scope to severe, mostly psychotic disorders is a good first step. Dr. Joanna Moncrieff, a psychiatrist, seems to share this view. In “Rethinking Modals of Psychotropic Drug Action,” and “The Psychoactive Effects of Psychiatric Medication,”  she proposed a “drug centered model” of drug action, rather than the existing “disease centered model,” whose core assumption is that psychotropic drugs help correct “a biochemical abnormality that represents a biological substrate of a specific disease process.”

In The Myth of the Chemical Cure, Moncrieff acknowledged abandoning the disease-centered model would challenge “some of the most fundamental principles of modern psychiatry.” Yet she said it would also open the way “to a more honest practice” that requires its own specialist knowledge, and implements a more democratic treatment process:

Adopting a drug-centred model of drug action would require psychiatrists to become more informed about the effects of different psychoactive drugs, and become attuned to evaluating the subjective experiences of their patients in a more equal and reciprocal relationship. Where their function was to participate in mechanisms of social control this would be openly acknowledged and rigidly controlled rather than veiled, as currently, under the cloak of medicine.

In “The Psychoactive Effects of Psychiatric Medication,” she pointed out how re-orienting drug therapy towards a drug-centered model raised some questions about the validity and relevance of diagnostic systems like the DSM-5. The idea that psychiatric drugs exert “a disease- or disorder-specific action” has been one of the principal justifications for modern psychiatric classification. Using psychiatric drugs explicitly for their psychoactive effects would require a different understanding of the nature of psychiatric problems. It would break the link between diagnoses and treatment, “and enable a frank discussion about the purpose and ethics of the already frequent ‘off-label’ use of prescribed psychoactive medications, such as their use for behavioral control in children and the elderly.”

Gardner and Kleinman were not advocating going this far, but I think psychiatry needs a transformation. Long live the transformation!

12/24/14

Where There’s Smoke …

bortn66 / 123RF Stock Photo
bortn66 / 123RF Stock Photo

As much as 4 ½ years before the publication of the DSM-5, there was growing public criticism of the American Psychiatric Association (APA) and the process they used to develop it. The amazing thing about this criticism is that it was from within the ranks of psychiatry itself … by psychiatrists who had been in charge of previous revisions of the DSM.

In a 2008 article, Benedict Carey of the New York Times pointed out the importance of the DSM as a “medical guidebook and a cultural institution.” It is used to help doctors make diagnoses and to provide diagnostic codes to insurance companies. The National Institute of Mental Health made the use of DSM criteria a requirement for funding research. But for the first time, the APA required its DSM contributors to sign a nondisclosure agreement.

Research psychiatrist Robert Spitzer said that when he first heard about the agreement, he went “bonkers.” Spitzer said: “Transparency is necessary if the document is to have credibility, and, in time, you’re going to have people complaining all over the place that they didn’t have the opportunity to challenge anything.”

Robert Spitzer, the chair of the “landmark” third edition of the DSM, has been hailed as the rescuer or savior of psychiatry. Allen Frances, the chair of the 4th edition of the DSM said in his book, Saving Normal, that Spitzer was a rare man. “Without Robert Spitzer, psychiatry might have become increasingly irrelevant.” Even critics of modern psychiatric diagnosis, such the authors of the book Mad Science, acknowledge Spitzer’s importance to psychiatry: “Robert Spitzer was a most unlikely rescuer of American psychiatry.”

On June 26, 2009, Frances published an article in the Psychiatric Times where he identified what he saw a grave problems with the DSM-5. He also was critical of the lack of transparency. Pointing to his own efforts with the DSM-IV, he said their goal had been to ensure that everyone would understand what they were doing and how they were going about it. “There was explicit accountability for decision making on all changes.” He cautioned against the stated ambition to effect a “paradigm shift” in psychiatric diagnosis with the DSM-5.

So long as psychiatric diagnosis is stuck at its current descriptive level, there is little to be gained and much to be lost in frequently and arbitrarily changing the system. Descriptive diagnosis should remain fairly stable until, disorder by disorder, we gradually attain a more fundamental and explanatory understanding of causality.

Frances specified his concerns with the DSM-5 process, which included the following: 1) there was no scientific basis to justify a paradigm shift in psychiatric diagnosis at this time; 2) there was a failure to provide clear methodological guidelines on the level of empirical support for the changes; 3) there was a failure to be open to wide scrutiny and useful criticism; 4) there was a failure to set and meet clear timelines; there was a likelihood that time pressure would lead to an unconsidered rush on last-minute decisions.

The members of the APA working on the DSM-5, including the DSM-5 Chair, David Kupfer, responded to Frances on July 1, 2009. They suggested that both Spitzer and Frances were repeating “factual errors and assumptions” about the development of the DSM-5. After their refutation of the concerns expressed by Frances, they stated:

Both Dr. Frances and Dr. Spitzer have more than a personal “pride of authorship” interest in preserving the DSM-IV and its related case book and study products. Both continue to receive royalties on DSM-IV associated products. The fact that Dr. Frances was informed at the APA Annual Meeting last month that subsequent editions of his DSM-IV associated products would cease when the new edition is finalized, should be considered when evaluating his critique and its timing.

Robert Spitzer responded to the criticisms raised about Allen Frances and himself on July 2, 2009. Spitzer noted how the DSM-5 debate had taken an ugly turn, by suggesting that he and Frances were critiquing the DSM for financial reasons. He limited his comments to what he saw as the core issue of transparency. After raising a series of questions with regard to the opaqueness and “empty rhetoric” on the DSM-5 as the most open and inclusive DSM ever, Spitzer saw two possible reasons for the lack of transparency. First, the answers to his questions were known, but for some reason, the DSM leadership was withholding it; perhaps to shield themselves from criticisms. A second possibility was that the DSM-5 leadership didn’t know the answers to his questions. “Given their plan to publish DSM-V in May 2012, if the second possibility is the case, it is inconceivable that this publication deadline could realistically be met. “

Both Spitzer and Frances continued their challenges to the process of review and approval of the DSM-5 by the APA and gained more support and even some victories. You can also read a more detailed description of the dispute here. The publication of the DSM-5 was delayed until May of 2013, but the controversy merely grew. Allen Frances became one of the most vocal critics of the DSM-5, with multiple blogs and articles looking at the problems and concerns. He’s even written two books, Saving Normal and Essentials of Psychiatric Diagnosis as a result of this controversy. You can scroll through some of his articles on the Huffington Post for starters.

Oh and with regard to the veiled accusation of Spitzer and Frances criticizing the DSM-5 for financial reasons, David Kupfer, Chair of the DSM-5 Task Force, has been outed for failing to report financial interests in Adaptive Testing Technologies, a company that designs tests and implements large scale adaptive testing systems for mental health assessment. After an investigation, the APA said (Letter-to-Assembly-20140114.pdf; now removed from the APA website): “Dr. Kupfer should have disclosed to APA his interest in PAI in 2012.” However, it did not find that his interest in PAI had any influence on DSM-5’s inclusion of dimensional measures for further study in Section 3. One blogger, 1 Boring Old Man said:

It seems like Dr. Kupfer et al. are pursuing a strategy of only acknowledging this particular Conflict of Interest when forced, as in the situation with JAMA Psychiatry, and avoiding talking about it otherwise – mirrored so far by the APA President and Board of Trustees.