Tag Archives: Janssen

01/18/22

Safety Concerns with Esketamine

© claudiondivizia | 123rf.com

It is approaching the three-year mark since the FDA approved Janssen’s Spravato (esketamine), in conjunction with an oral antidepressant to treat adults with treatment-resistant depression. The acting director of the Division of Psychiatry Products in the FDA’s Center for Drug Evaluation and Research said at the time, “There has been a long-standing need for additional effective treatments for treatment-resistant depression, a serious and life-threatening condition.” Esketamine was later approved to treat adults with major depressive disorder with suicidal thoughts. Despite the approval, Janssen said it is not known if esketamine is “safe and effective for use in preventing suicide or in reducing suicidal thoughts.”

Joanna Moncrieff and Mark Horowitz originally expressed concern in “Esketamine for treatment resistant depression” that history was repeating itself, that “a known drug of abuse, associated with significant harm, with scant evidence of efficacy, is being submitted for licensing, without adequate long-term safety studies.” In their 2019 article, they said they were surprised to see an article in the BMJ endorsing esketamine, as they thought it had been approved on “flimsy evidence.” Only one of three trials of acute treatment was positive and “the difference between esketamine and placebo was not large.” Particularly when compared to the large placebo effect. They acknowledged that serious adverse effects could take time to come to light, and concluded their article with the following warning:

Leaving this crucial research until after the drug is licenced, as the FDA has done in the United States … puts the public at risk and sets depressed patients up as unwitting guinea pigs in a huge and unregulated pharmaceutical experiment.

Peter Gøtzsche et al thought the safety and efficacy of esketamine was exaggerated. They thought the available evidence found that esketamine was “more likely to harm than benefit patients with resistant depression.” They thought esketamine should not be used in clinical practice. “But only as an experimental drug in randomised trials of adequate length, with long-term follow up, and with patient relevant outcomes assessing both harms and benefits.”

Horowitz and Moncrieff have updated their previous analysis in “Esketamine: uncertain safety and efficacy data in depression.” By June 2021, six 4-week efficacy trials have been published, with only one reporting a statistically significant difference between placebo nasal spray and esketamine. The one trial finding a statistically significant effect of four points, was not clinically significant given the large effect size (15.8 points) in the placebo plus antidepressant section of the study. It was also less than the 6.5-point difference used by Janssen in their sample size calculation; and had no long-term efficacy data. “The time point of four weeks in all these studies means the data are rather uninformative, since treatment-resistant depression in usually treated for months or years.”

They noted how other national health service organizations such as NICE (National Institute for Health Care Excellence) have examined the same evidence as the FDA and did not approve the drug for treatment resistant depression. However, NICE has launched a second consultation on the use of esketamine for treatment resistant depression after receiving feedback that it could benefit some patients. The results of that consultation have not been released yet. Horowitz has been critical of NICE’s delay of their decision on Twitter, saying: “Janssen’s antidepressant might not be much good, but their marketing spin is second to none. Hats off. I wonder whether NICE is in the spin room as they have been persuaded to delay their decision on esketamine for 10 months.”

Horowitz and Moncrieff compiled a table (see below) of withdrawal symptoms 4 weeks after stopping esketamine. They acknowledged the table did not establish a causal attribution between the symptoms and stopping esketamine. The large numbers in the esketamine group and longer duration of treatment also may have inflated suicides in that group.

In the safety study, one in seven patients developed ‘treatment-emergent’ suicidal ideations and six attempted suicides occurred in a group “selected for not being actively suicidal.” Using the FDA Adverse Event Reporting System (FAERS) database, Gastaldon et al found a disproportionate number of suicides could be attributed to esketamine in the first year of its use in the USA. Their conclusion was, “Esketamine may carry a clear potential for serious AEs [adverse events], which deserves urgent clarification by means of further prospective studies.”

The doses of esketamine were similar to recreational doses of ketamine, which causes tolerance, dependence and withdrawal. The FDA and Janssen said withdrawal symptoms were probably not relevant in the relapse prevention study. Yet Janssen did not report data from the Physician Withdrawal Checklist to support this conclusion.

Although it is difficult to be definitive about the nature of experiences that occur following drug discontinuation, the possibility that withdrawal effects were mistaken for relapse requires consideration, as withdrawal effects overlap with most items on the Montgomery–Åsberg Depression Rating Scale. NICE concluded that “any withdrawal effect would be difficult to distinguish from a change in depressive symptoms.”

The Janssen trial studies were also not representative of all individuals with major depression. They only included individuals who had failed two antidepressants (representing 44% of patients with depression). The studies excluded people with a recent history of suicidal intention, psychiatric comorbidity, drug and alcohol problems, vagal nerve stimulation (VNS) and deep brain stimulation (DBS).

Another confounding effect in the efficacy with esketamine is the known fact that ketamine, like other anesthetics, cause a pleasurable ‘high’ for some users. It is not clear how this drug induced euphoria and the antidepressant effects can be distinguished. Horowitz and Moncrieff concluded that:

Overall, the central points of our Analysis remain: esketamine has a clinically uncertain effect at 4 weeks, and there are no studies with longer follow-up periods more relevant for the care of people with depression. The discontinuation trial potentially conflates relapse and withdrawal and there are concerning safety signals.

Successful suicides that occurred during the clinical trials were glossed over or presented as unrelated to esketamine. The FDA “Briefing Document” for the committee indicated there were three successful suicides; all were esketamine-treated subjects. After parsing the differences between the three cases, the Briefing Document said: “Given the small number of cases, the severity of the patients’ underlying illness, and the lack of a consistent pattern among these cases, it is difficult to consider these deaths as drug-related.” In “Nasal Spray for Depression? Not So Fast,” Kim Witzcak said: “In my opinion, we need more information on the potential link to suicide before an assumption can be made that it’s safe.”

The adverse events identified in the Briefing Document of the greatest concern were sedation, dissociation, and increased blood pressure; most of which occurred within the first two hours of administration. In order to minimize the risk of misuse and abuse of esketamine, the committee proposed following a Risk Evaluation Mitigation Strategies (REMS). The FDA can require REMS for certain medications with serious safety concerns to help ensure the benefits of the medication outweigh its risks. “REMS are not designed to mitigate adverse events of a medication, rather, it focuses on preventing, monitoring and/or managing a specific serious risk by informing, educating and/or reinforcing actions to reduce the frequency and/or severity of the event.”

How did a drug with all of these concerns get approved by the FDA? There were exceptions made in the FDA approval process for esketamine as a “breakthrough therapy.” Witczak said the term treatment resistant depression (TRD) is the buzzword that allows drug companies to obtain FDA fast tracking:

Such designation gives the pharmaceutical company the ability to present smaller, fewer clinical trials in order to get their drug to market quicker. While most approved antidepressants currently on the market had to show effectiveness data from at least two positive short-term trials, Janssen only presented one positive short-term trial and the second is an incomplete picture as it is from a withdrawal trial. Janssen’s other trials failed to meet their primary endpoints for efficacy.

Janssen is persisting in its efforts to expand the market for Spravato/esketamine. It appears to me they convinced NICE to delay announcing their decision on esketamine for 10 months in order for the company to spin some additional information. And perhaps to convince NICE to reverse its rejection of esketamine. For more on esketamine, see: “Esketamine Craze,” “Hype and Concern with Esketamine,” “Evaluating the Risks With Esketamine,” and “Doublethink with Spravato?”

09/3/19

Red Flags with Spravato

Darryl Brooks | 123rf.com

Spravato (esketamine) was approved as a fast-acting antidepressant for treatment-resistant depression in March 2019. There were several problems with the FDA’s approval of the drug, including the price—nearly $900 per dose, the acceptance of a withdrawal study for the needed second positive clinical trial, and the fact that it carries a boxed warning that cautions patients are at risk of “suicidal thoughts and behaviors after administration of the drug.” And like ketamine, it is a Schedule III controlled substance, putting patients at risk for abuse and misuse. It seems Spravato needs some positive spin to win a patient population.

Dr. John Miller obliged, writing an article for Psychiatric Times, “Depression’s Journey From Monoamines to Glutamate.” He traced the history of ketamine as a racemic mixture, meaning it has an equal mixture of esketamine and arketamine. Janssen developed its intranasal spray with esketamine and named this new molecular entity Spravato. The so-called “paradigm shift” of depression treatment with ketamine acting on the NMDA glutamate receptor, and appearing to reduce depressive symptoms within 72 hours, was contrasted with the older, traditional monamine hypothesis of depression that would take weeks. All other FDA-approved antidepressants before Spravato act on the monoamine system.

Dr. Miller then guided his readers through a review of the two positive clinical trials submitted to the FDA for approval of Spravato. There were actually five phase 3 clinical trials, meaning Spravato failed to demonstrate statistical significance in three of the five clinical trials. Nevertheless, he saw Spravato as crossing into “a new paradigm of TRD [treatment resistant depression].” He hoped esketamine was the first of “a long list of non-monoamine-based treatments to help improve the lives and functioning of the many individuals suffering from TRD.” By the way, Dr. Miller is on Janssen’s Advisory Board as well as the Speaker’s Bureau for Spravato.

Another study by Daly et al, “Efficacy and Safety of intranasal Esketamine Adjunctive to Oral Antidepressant Therapy in Treatment-Resistant Depression” found a “clinically meaningful treatment effect” versus placebo. The antidepressant response was rapid and dose related. It seemed to persist for more than 2 months with a lower dosing frequency. Jodi Rintelman reviewed the study for The Mental Elf, and said it gave hope for a fast-acting antidepressant. Depression scores showed statistical improvement in seven days. “That’s a huge improvement over SSRIs, which can take 4 to 8 weeks to show significant improvement in mood.”

CEP (Council for Evidence-Based Psychiatry) pointed out on Twitter how the Mental Elf article initially failed to note that eight of the study’s authors were Janssen employees. In the comments section to the blog, Andre Tomlin then cited two paragraphs quoted below that appeared in the blog article afterwards. The first was added to the Strengths and Limitations section and the second was in the Implications for Practice section.

The authors also may have a vested interest in Spravato’s commercial success. Renaissance Pharmaceuticals, LLC is manufacturing Spravato for Janssen Pharmaceuticals, Inc. Eight of the authors, including the lead author, work for Janssen Research & Development and hold stock in the company. As the U. S. Food and Drug Administration continues to provide less money for drug development, drug companies are picking up the slack. The impact of this funding trend on our patients is not yet known.

It’s important to note that while no deaths were reported in this trial, in the trials reported to the FDA for consideration, there were six deaths in the treatment arms. While none of the deaths were proven to be drug-related, three people died from suicide, one from a motorcycle accident, one had a heart attack, and the sixth person likely died as a result of complications from hypertension and obesity.

Then Bloomberg reported President Trump offered to help the Department of Veterans Affairs to negotiate the acquisition of Spravato, saying he had “really read quite a bit” about the drug and believed it could help reduce the suicide rates of veterans. He told the Veteran Affairs Secretary, Robert Wilkie, he thought Johnson & Johnson (the parent company of Janssen) would be very generous to the VA. The President said:

Give it to anybody that has the problem, because you have people calling and our folks do a great job on the phone — but it’s a telephone. . . . You have people calling for help and if those people had that, I’m hearing like instantaneously they’re in better shape.

Wilkie acknowledged the medicine was “very effective” and hoped Spravato would have the drug in all VA hospitals by the end of the year. But concern that the President’s remarks were contributing to a rushed approval by the VA, led Mark Takano, the Chairman of the House Committee on Veterans’ Affairs, to say:

I am incredibly alarmed by reporting today that suggests Spravato, a controversial new drug, is being rushed through critical reviews and may be prescribed to veterans before fully vetting the potential risks and benefits.

Already, many concerns have been raised about the drug’s safety and efficacy, its suspicious fast-track approval through FDA review, and VA’s contracting process. Today’s reporting raises additional concerns that VA’s own process for objective review is being undercut by undue influences.  Questions remain about the ultimate impact on the health and safety of veterans, who should not be made into a “test case” while the clinical community continues to gather data about this treatment.

We demand that VA provide documents and information about its review and contracting process to adequately address critical questions—including whether VA officials were pressured by the White House or the Mar-a-Lago “three” to prescribe this drug to veterans. Spravato should not be added to VA’s formulary until we have more answers about what this means for our nation’s veterans.

The VA announced that it would offer Spravato for treatment-resistant depression, but would not include it on the VA’s formulary, meaning doctors need prior approval before prescribing and buying the medication for patients. A VA spokesperson said VA psychiatrists could offer Spravato “when clinically indicated,” but would have to keep “with the FDA-approved indications for esketamine use and safety requirements.” Susan Carter, the VA’s director of media relations said the VA will closely monitor the drug’s use and effectiveness and compare it with other treatments. Mark Takano said he asked the VA to provide documents and information to ensure the VA was not “pressured by the White House” to prescribe Spravato to veterans. Takano said: “Spravato should not be added to VA’s formulary until we have more answers about what this means for our nation’s veterans.”

Three psychiatrists, including one who is a therapist for the MAPS Clinical Study of MDMA-Assisted Psychotherapy for PTSD, wrote an opinion article for Vice, “The New Ketamine-Based Antidepressant Is a Rip-Off.” They pointed out where esketamine was no better than placebo in two of the three short-term Phase III trials submitted to the FDA for approval. Yet they thought the problems with the drug weren’t the biggest concern. Spravato (esketamine) is just a way for “Johnson & Johnson to make a significant profit off gullible insurance companies and vulnerable patients.”

Ordinary ketamine is a racemic medication, meaning it is made up of two molecules that are mirror images of each other. Because ordinary ketamine is generic, Johnson & Johnson simply isolated one of the two molecules in regular ketamine so that it qualified as “new.” The reality is that we don’t know whether esketamine is more or less effective than regular ketamine because there have been no head-to-head trials between the two. Johnson & Johnson only tested esketamine against a placebo, likely because they feared esketamine might actually perform worse than the generic version.

Kaiser Health News described a series of red flags overlooked by the FDA with Spravato. There was only modest evidence of its effectiveness and then only in limited trials. Janssen provided no information on the safety of Spravato for long-term use beyond 60 weeks. And as noted above, there were three patients who died by suicide during clinical trials. Facing political pressure to rapidly bring drugs treating life-threatening conditions to market, the FDA endorsed it anyway.

Some deep misgivings were expressed by members of the FDA advisory board in its day-long review meeting. Dr. Jess Fiedorowicz, a member of the advisory committee and the director of the Mood Disorders Center at the University of Iowa, said Spravato’s benefit was “almost certainly exaggerated.” He was surprised by the vote, which was strongly in favor of the drug. The approval process for esketamine (Spravato) shows how drug makers take advantage of several steps in the FDA approval process to bring a potentially lucrative drug to market.

The first Step was taken in 2013 when Janssen was able to get the FDA to approve esketamine as a “breakthrough therapy” for it potential to rapidly reverse depression. This is a holy grail for suicidal patients, especially those found in emergency rooms. That potential was based upon a two-day study with 30 patients being given esketamine intravenously. This “breakthrough therapy’ status placed esketamine in a fast track for approval, with more frequent input from the FDA.

The second Step in the process occurred during discussions between FDA regulators and Janssen regarding the amount and quality of evidence required by the agency. With regard to Spravato, questions were raised about how many drugs must fail before a patient’s depression in considered “treatment-resistant”? And how many successful clinical trials are necessary for FDA approval of a potentially life-saving drug?

The third Step left the FDA’s expert advisory committee hamstrung in reaching a verdict before they met. With Spravato, the FDA had pre-approved Janssen’s study design. This caused Fiedorowicz to abstain from voting because he considered the study design to be flawed.

The expert panel cleared the drug according to the evidence that the agency and Janssen had determined was sufficient. Dr. Matthew Rudorfer, an associate director at the National Institute of Mental Health, concluded that the “benefits outweighed the risks.” Explaining his “yes” vote, he said: “I think we’re all agreeing on the very important, and sometimes life-or-death, risk of inadequately treated depression that factored into my equation.”

But others who also voted “yes” were more explicit in their qualms. “I don’t think that we really understand what happens when you take this week after week for weeks and months and years,” said Steven Meisel, the system director of medication safety for Fairview Health Services based in Minneapolis.

Although the drug received breakthrough status for its potential for results in 24 hours, the trials were not strong enough for the FDA to say it was “rapid-acting.” Janssen only provided one successful short-term trial when the FDA typically requires at least two. In order to reach the two-trial threshold, the FDA permitted the company to count a trial conducted for a different purpose: relapse and remission trends. And the single positive efficacy trial showed a mere 4-point improvement in depression symptoms compared to the placebo treatment on a 60-point scale used by some clinicians to measure depression severity. Some committee members pointed out how the study wasn’t really blind since participants could recognize they were getting the drug from side effects like a temporary out-of-body experience.

And finally, the FDA lowered the criteria bar for “treatment-resistant depression.” Initially, that meant trial participants had to have failed two classes of oral antidepressants. Less than two years later, the FDA loosened that definition to say a patient needed to have only failed with two different pills, no matter what the class. Forty-nine of the 227 participants in Janssen’s only successful efficacy trial had failed just one class of oral antidepressants. Dr. Erick Turner, a former FDA reviewer who serves on the committee but did not attend the meeting said “They weeded out the true treatment-resistant patients.”

Red flags were waving all around the approval of Spravato, but they seemed to be disregarded by the FDA. Is the pipeline of developing new antidepressants so bankrupt that the FDA has to turn the clinical trial process into a game of limbo by continually lowering the bar for approval of a new medication?

For more on the worries with ketamine and Spravato, see “Hype and Concern with Esketamine.”

03/12/19

Hype and Concern with Esketamine

© lightwise | 123rf.com

Just before Valentine’s Day in 2019 an FDA advisory panel voted in favor (14 yes, 2 no, 1 abstain) of approving esketamine for the treatment of adult patients with treatment resistant depression (TRD). Psychiatry Advisor reported the decision was based on 5 Phase 3 studies. Patients in the studies had a diagnosis of Major Depression and a history of inadequate response to at least two previous antidepressants, the FDA criteria for TRD. Two of the five studies “showed that esketamine nasal spray plus a newly initiated oral antidepressant was associated with a statistically significant, clinically meaningful, rapid, and sustained improvement of depression symptoms.” So why are some experts concerned and hesitant?

In a STAT News article, Dr. Wendy Marsh said overall, esketamine is definitely of value. Dr. Eric Turner, a psychiatrist who serves on the FDA advisory committee, but couldn’t attend the recent meeting, said: “There’s sort of a split in academia. Some are cheering for something new and others are more skeptical.” Part of the concern is what the label “Treatment Resistant Depression” allows. Writing for Mad in America in “Nasal Spray for Depression? Not So Fast,” Kim Witczak said TRD is the new buzzword that allows drug companies to obtain FDA fast tracking or designation as a “breakthrough therapy.”

Such designation gives the pharmaceutical company the ability to present smaller, fewer clinical trials in order to get their drug to market quicker. While most approved antidepressants currently on the market had to show effectiveness data from at least two positive short-term trials, Janssen only presented one positive short-term trial and the second is an incomplete picture as it is from a withdrawal trial. Janssen’s other trials failed to meet their primary endpoints for efficacy.

Janssen, a subsidiary of Johnson & Johnson, submitted five Phase 3 studies: three short-term, one maintenance and one long-term safety study. One of the positive studies was a randomized trial in adults under the age of 65 with TRD who were started on an oral antidepressant and esketamine. After one month, around 70% of patients taking esketamine responded, where just over 50% in the placebo group had. The second positive study was a maintenance-of-effect study, where participants who responded to esketamine in one of the short-term studies are randomly assigned to either continue with the drug or be switched to a placebo. The FDA typically wants two successful studies, “but historically, withdrawal studies haven’t counted towards the total.”

Eric Turner said: “The threshold has been two adequate and well-controlled trials. In this case, they only got one.” Based on that, he would have voted no had he been at the meeting. Julie Zito was at the meeting and was one of the two advisory committee members who did vote “no,” thinking the risks if esketamine outweighed the benefits. If the drug was approved, she would like to see providers, patients and the families of patients keep tabs on possible side effects and how well the drug is working.

Dr. Gerard Sanacora, a psychiatrist who has been involved in several esketamine trials and has also served as a consultant to Janssen, said: “This is gonna be the big question: How do we use this in the clinic?” Current treatment protocol calls for esketamine to be given twice a week for the first month, then reduced to once a week or once every two weeks during the maintenance phase. But there are still questions about long-term treatment with esketamine, including how long to keep a patient on the medication and what the risks of long-term use might be.

Kim Witzcak also noted there were successful suicides that occurred during the clinical trials that were glossed over or presented as unrelated to esketamine. The FDA “Briefing Document” for the committee indicated there were three successful suicides; all were esketamine-treated subjects. After parsing the differences between all three cases, the Briefing Document said: “Given the small number of cases, the severity of the patients’ underlying illness, and the lack of a consistent pattern among these cases, it is difficult to consider these deaths as drug-related.” Witzcak said: “In my opinion, we need more information on the potential link to suicide before an assumption can be made that it’s safe.”

The adverse events identified in the Briefing Document as of the greatest concern were sedation, dissociation, and increased blood pressure; most of which occurred within the first two hours of administration. In order to minimize the risk of misuse and abuse of esketamine, the committee has proposed the following Risk Evaluation Mitigation Strategies (REMS). The FDA can require REMS for certain medications with serious safety concerns to help ensure the benefits of the medication outweigh its risks. “REMS are not designed to mitigate adverse events of a medication, rather, it focuses on preventing, monitoring and/or managing a specific serious risk by informing, educating and/or reinforcing actions to reduce the frequency and/or severity of the event.”

First, they would ensure esketamine is only dispensed to hospitals, certified outpatient pharmacies, and certified outpatient sites of care. A healthcare professional would monitor patients when they self-administer esketamine and then watch for transient dissociative and blood pressure changes until the patient is stable to leave the healthcare setting.

Second, pharmacies, practitioners and healthcare settings that dispense the drug would be specially certified to be sure esketamine is not dispensed directly to patients. They would be educated about the risks of esketamine and the importance of monitoring patients after the dose is self-administered.

Third, prescribers would register patients in the REMS program. “As part of the enrollment process, patients would be informed of the risks and the need for patients to report adverse events to their provider between patient visits.”

But Witzcak said she thinks most of the FDA Advisory Committee members vote for these controversial drugs and assume the REMS program will address any of their potential safety concerns. “What they fail to realize is that the REMS program is not enforceable and the drug companies are responsible for managing and reporting to the FDA.” She does not trust the drug companies and the FDA to do what they said they would do.

Eric Turner was also concerned with the hype around esketamine. He’s worried that although there is evidence that esketamine works, it will be seen and hyped as superior to other drugs for treatment-resistant depression or as a therapy that can produce rapid results—”two points he says studies don’t yet support.” Gerard Sanacora said patients will often wonder why they can’t just try the drug before seeing whether they respond to standard oral antidepressants. He is concerned the excitement over esketamine will lead patients to want it as a first-line treatment; or even a cure. “The danger is having it so positively portrayed. . . . I’ve been around enough to know this is not necessarily a condition [depression] that responds to miracle drugs.”

The drug is a chemical mirror of ketamine, used as an anesthetic and abused recreationally as “Special K.” For several decades ketamine has been known to be a drug of abuse. And in 1999 it was designated as a Schedule III controlled substance. Ketamine is abused for its dissociative and hallucinogenic effects. It also exists as a popular “club drug” used at nightclubs and raves. Like ketamine, esketamine would be a Schedule III controlled substance. Hopefully the hype over esketamine will not overshadow the potential dangers and adverse events.

On March 4, 2019 the NPR show, All Things Considered, said the FDA was expected to approve esketamine. Courtney Billington, the president of Janessen Neuroscience said if approved, it would be marketed under the brand name Spravato. While he confirmed it will only be available in approved and certified treatment centers and limited to patients who have unsuccessfully tried at least two other antidepressants, it was predicted that doctors already comfortable prescribing ketamine will continue to do so. A psychiatrist or physician can prescribe ketamine without the restrictions that will be applied to esketamine. “The generic form is cheap and can be taken at home in a nasal spray once patients know the right dose.”

Then on March 5, 2019 the FDA approved esketamine (Spravato). Johnson & Johnson, the parent company for Janessen, said the wholesale cost of each esketamine treatment will be in the $590 to $885 range, depending on the dose. As an aside, there will likely be a tolerance built with Spravato over time, requiring increased doses for the same antidepressant effect. The projected J&J price means that the recommended twice-weekly treatments during the first month will cost at least $4,720 to $6,785. Treatments afterwards will cost about half as much. A ketamine infusion directory stated the costs for ketamine infusion range from $400 to $2,000.

Spravato contains a boxed warning that cautions “patients are at risk for sedation and difficulty with attention and thinking (dissociation), abuse and misuse, and suicidal thoughts and behaviors after administration of the drug.” Stop a minute and think about this. Spravato has been approved for treatment-resistant depression, and the noted side effects include misuse/abuse of the drug itself and suicidal thoughts and behaviors! And the work around coming at some point will be the development of a nasal spray device that can be used with ketamine without the restrictions applied to Spravato.  In pursuit of the newest possible “treatment” for depression, FDA has crossed a boundary into territory that apparently sets aside the maxim to “First do no harm” when approving drugs. Are the risks of Spravato really worth it?

I’ve written several articles here addressing concerns with ketamine or esketamine. This is the twelfth one. See: “Falling Down the K-Hole,” “Esketamine Craze” and “Is Ketamine Really Safe & Non-Toxic?” for more information; or just search for ketamine or esketamine. You can read “Bait and Switch: the Great Ketamine ‘Breakthrough’” for a personal story about someone who almost enrolled in one of the failed clinical trials.

03/11/15

Lair, Liar Pants on Fire

© Wisconsinart | Dreamstime.com

© Wisconsinart | Dreamstime.com

Okay, well perhaps TECHNICALLY Janssen Pharmaceuticals, a division of Johnson and Johnson (J&J) didn’t lie about Risperdal to the public. But thousands of recent lawsuits have charged that there is a troubling side effect in young men who take the medication: gynecomastia. That means it can trigger abnormal breast growth in the males who use the drug.

Mad in America reported that the law firm of Pintas and Mullins (linked above) reported that there were 1,250 pending cases against  J&J (most of which are related to abnormal breast growth) out of which six were selected as “bellweather” trials in 2012. However, Janssen agreed to settle those cases before they went to trial. Janssen also agreed to settle another 80 cases in early 2013. Historically, this has been a regular legal tactic of pharmaceutical companies when they are sued. Peter Breggin has noted how this method and others were used by pharmaceutical companies to neutralize potentially damaging lawsuits against them; and keep the information they contained from becoming public knowledge.

But that doesn’t always work. Pintas and Mullins, Mad in America, Peter Breggin and FiercePharma have reported on past settlements made by Janssen for misleading statements about Risperdal.  In November of 2013 Janssen agreed to pay a $2.2 billion settlement with the federal government for false claims over Risperdal. The company pled guilty to illegally promoting the off-label use of Risperdal with the elderly suffering with dementia or Alzheimer’s in nursing homes. Janssen also settled off-label marketing claims with 36 states and the District of Columbia over Risperdal for $180 million; then with Texas for another $158 million. So I suppose we could say that Janssen was found guilty of lying about Risperdal in these off-label marketing cases.

Recent cases include a lawsuit argued in Philadelphia regarding a 20-year-old man with autism, who took Risperdal to help with irritability caused by his autism. He began taking the drug as an eight-year-old, despite the fact it was only approved for use with adults at that time. FiercePharma reported that the man’s then pediatric neurologist, Jan Mathisen, said sales reps from Janssen had distributed Risperdal samples twenty times between 2002 and 2004, 5 years before the drug was approved for use in autistic children. After a day in court, the autistic man’s mother tearfully said that she was having a difficult time after “Hearing what the pharmaceutical company was doing.”

Janssen claimed that the company’s warnings were complete and proper, and that it did not miss-market the drug. In a statement provided to Blooomberg Business, a Janssen spokesperson claimed that Risperdal “has improved the lives of countless children and adults throughout the world who suffer from debilitating mental illnesses, and it continues to improve patients’ quality of life today.”

Janssen claims that Risperdal’s labels always included warnings of the risk of gynecomastia in adults, and notified doctors that it was not proven safe for use in children. The Pintas and Mullins article said the company claims that the doctor who prescribed Risperdal to the autistic man should be held at fault. In addition,

Janssen is accused not only of illegally marketing Risperdal, but also of paying doctors to speak favorably of the drug. The company paid for gold outings and other flashy incentives to get doctors to prescribe the drug to patients just like the eight-year-old in Alabama. Many of those boys taking Risperdal grew breasts and had to undergo mastectomies.

A former FDA commissioner, David Kessler, testified in Philadelphia that Johnson and Johnson knew as early as 2001 that Risperdal could cause boys to grow breasts—a full five years before the company added the warning about the potential side effect to the drug’s official label. In support of his claim, Kessler pointed to a 2001 study, FUNDED BY J&J that indicated 3.8% of boys using Risperdal in a clinical trial developed breasts. He commented that the study should have been a red flag to the company. According to Bloomberg, the neurologist Mathisen said in his testimony that he would have liked to have known about the study.

A J&J lawyer said that Kessler was a biased witness or “hired gun” because he commonly testified in drug-safety trials since leaving the FDA in 1997 (see articles here and here). She suggested that he was “cutting and pasting” findings from other cases into his conclusions that: 1) officials at Janssen knew Risperdal caused some boys to develop breasts and 2) failed to alert patients, doctors and regulators about it. Kessler disputed her claims saying, “Each case is complex and there is an enormous amount of details associated with them . . . . To say I’ve testified each and every time the same way would be incorrect.” He also indicated where he has testified on behalf of pharmaceutical companies in the past.

As I first wrote this, the trial in Philadelphia was scheduled to take another few weeks. I was rooting for a ruling in favor of the autistic man and his family, which did happen! The Wall Street Journal reported that a Philadelphia jury decided Johnson & Johnson had to pay $2.5 million in damages for failing to warn that Risperdal could cause gynecomastia. The attorney representing the autistic man said: J&J “hid data from the FDA, prescribing doctors and parents. Documents showed they knew there was much higher percentage of children getting gynecomastia than they admitted.”

The settlement is relatively modest, considering what J&J has made from Risperdal. In the seven years between 2003 and 2010, Risperdal grossed more than $24 billion worldwide; 4.5 billion in 2007, the year it went off patent. While there should be enough capital to settle the case without J&J going bankrupt, with the additional 1,200 plus lawsuits, it may be a good time to divest yourself of J&J stock.